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2), DECLAS: IMPOSSIBLE TO DETER-
MINE. WARNING NOTICE, SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED
TAGS: PFOR, CB, CH, VN, XC
SUBJECT: CAMBODIA: COMPLEMENTARY ROLES FOR HANOI AND
PEKING

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF INR RESEARCH STUDY ISSUED MAY 14
(THIS IS SECOND IN SERIES OF REPORTS ON SINO-NORTH
VIETNAMESE RELATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA; SEE STATE 021626
DATED FEBRUARY 1 FOR SUMMARY OF REPORT ON LAOS):

1. SINCE THE MID-FIFTIES PEKING AND HANOI HAVE PLAYED
DIFFERENT ROLES WITH RESPECT TO CAMBODIA, BASED ON SOMEWHAT
DIFFERENT INTERESTS. THEIR POLICIES, HOWEVER, HAVE BEEN
SIMILAR OR AT LEAST COMPLEMENTARY. THE CHINESE HAVE SOUGHT
TO PROMOTE THEIR OWN INFLUENCE IN PHNOM PENH OVER THE YEARS,
BUT THEY HAVE NOT YET DONE SO AT THE EXPENSE OF THE NORTH
VIETNAMESE, WHOSE INTERESTS PEKING'S ACTIONS HAVE OFTEN
FURTHERED. THERE SEEMS LITTLE PROSPECT THAT THIS SITUATION
WILL CHANGE MUCH IN THE NEAR FUTURE, AND, ALTHOUGH SINO-
DRV RIVALRY IN CAMBODIA MAY SURFACE IN THE LONGER RUN, IT
IS NOT LIKELY TO BECOME A MAJOR PROBLEM.

2. BY THE MID-FIFTIES THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS HAD LONG-
STANDING TIES WITH THE ANTI-FRENCH, ANTI-SIHANOUK INSUR-
GENCY AND SAW CAMBODIA PRIMARILY IN TERMS OF THEIR

OBJECTIVES IN VIETNAM. PEKING'S STANCE TOWARD RECENTLY
INDEPENDENT CAMBODIA WAS DETERMINED BY ITS NEW, MORE
FLEXIBLE BANDUNG DIPLOMACY, AND PRINCE SIHANOUK WAS CULTI-
VATED AS A MAJOR SPOKESMAN FOR CHINESE-FLAVORED, ANTI-
WESTERN NEUTRALISM.

3. RELATIONS BETWEEN NORTH VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA WERE ALSO
FAIRLY CORDIAL IN THE POST-BANDUNG ERA, BECAUSE HANOI COULD
PROFIT MORE FROM ENCOURAGING SIHANOUK'S "ANTI-IMPERIALISM"
AND HIS ENMITY TOWARD THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT THAN
FROM ACTIVE SUPPORT OF HIS INTERNAL OPPONENTS. ESPECIALLY
AFTER THE COMMUNISTS RENEWED THEIR DRIVE IN SOUTH VIETNAM
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TOWARD THE END OF THE DECADE AND NEEDED TO USE CAMBODIAN
TERRITORY, IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR HANOI TO AVOID GIVING
SIHANOUK ANY OFFENSE ON THE SENSITIVE ISSUE OF THE KHMER
ROUGE.

4. SIHANOUK MAY HAVE ATTRIBUTED HANOI'S RELATIVELY GOOD
BEHAVIOR TO PEKING'S INFLUENCE, BUT HIS BELIEF THAT THE
CHINESE COULD BE USED AGAINST THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WAS NOT

PUT TO THE TEST UNTIL THE MID-SIXTIES. BY THEN PEKING'S INTEREST IN SIHANOUK HAD DIMINISHED, AND THE CHINESE HAD COME TO SEE CAMBODIA MORE AS HANOI DID--AS AN ADJUNCT OF THE VIETNAMESE CONFLICT. ACCORDINGLY, THE CHINESE REJECTED SIHANOUK'S APPEALS TO THEM TO INTERCEDE WITH HANOI ON BEHALF OF HIS EFFORTS TO INSULATE CAMBODIA FROM THE ESCALATING CONFLICT IN VIETNAM.

5. EVENTUALLY, IN MID-1967, HANOI CONCEDED THE GESTURE OF UNILATERALLY DECLARING ITS RESPECT FOR CAMBODIA'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND NEUTRALITY. THIS ACTION SEEMED TO REFLECT CONCERN THAT SIHANOUK WOULD OTHERWISE SEEK TO CURTAIL CONTINUED COMMUNIST USE OF HIS TERRITORY, RATHER THAN ANY PRESSURE FROM PEKING. THE CHINESE, HOWEVER, PROBABLY SHARED HANOI'S VIEW OF THE WISDOM OF THE GESTURE. IN THEIR OWN EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN CHINESE INFLUENCE IN CAMBODIA WHILE ASSISTING HANOI, THEIR INVESTMENT HAD GROWN MORE SUBSTANTIAL, OWING TO SIHANOUK'S AGREEMENT IN MID-1966 TO DIVIDE INCREASED CHINESE ARMS SHIPMENTS BETWEEN THE CAMBODIAN ARMY (FANK) AND THE VIET CONG IN SOUTHERN SOUTH VIETNAM.

6. IN MID-1968, CHINESE AND NORTH VIETNAMESE INTERESTS AGAIN WERE ENGAGED WHEN SIHANOUK BECAME CONCERNED OVER POSSIBLE US/GVN COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST THE DRAMATICALLY INCREASED NVA/VC USE OF CAMBODIA FOLLOWING THE TET OFFENSIVE. PEKING AND HANOI INITIALLY IGNORED SIHANOUK'S PROTESTS. BUT THEY ACTIVELY SOUGHT TO MOLLIFY HIM WHEN HE

TOOK ACTION IN THE SPRING OF 1969 THAT THREATENED BOTH THE VIETNAMESE USE OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY IN THE NORTHEAST AND THE CHINESE ARMS TRAFFIC IN THE SOUTH.

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7. CHOU EN-LAI REPORTEDLY PROMISED TO URGE THE DRV TO REDUCE ITS ACTIVITIES, BUT, IF ANYTHING, THE VIETNAMESE PRESENCE INCREASED, AS DID THEIR ASSISTANCE TO THE KHMER ROUGE. SOME OF THE CHINESE ARMS WERE RELEASED TO THE VIET CONG, BUT PRC DIPLOMATS WERE STILL SEEKING THE RELEASE OF THE REMAINDER AS THE INTERNAL CAMBODIAN POLITICAL CONFLICT CULMINATED, IN MARCH 1970, WITH SIHANOUK'S OUSTER.

8. FOR A FEW MONTHS AFTER SIHANOUK'S FALL, PEKING AND HANOI ADOPTED DIFFERENT APPROACHES. PEKING'S EFFORTS APPEARED TO BE DIRECTED TOWARD LESSENING THE CHANCES OF FANK ACTION AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE STRONGHOLDS AND AT REOPENING THE WEAPONS TRAFFIC WHILE TRYING TO MAINTAIN ITS INFLUENTIAL POSITION IN CAMBODIA. THUS, WHILE RECEIVING SIHANOUK IN PEKING, THE CHINESE REMAINED IN PHNOM PENH AND

TRIED TO DEAL WITH LON NOL. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, MEANWHILE, LEFT PHNOM PENH, TOOK THE OFFENSIVE TO SECURE THEIR LOGISTIC PIPELINE, AND THREW THEIR FULL PUBLIC SUPPORT TO SIHANOUK. PEKING'S SUPPORT FOR SIHANOUK BECAME LESS EQUIVOCAL AS IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT THEIR EFFORTS WITH LON NOL WERE BEARING NO FRUIT; THE LATE APRIL INDOCHINESE PEOPLE'S CONFERENCE IN SOUTH CHINA SYMBOLIZED PEKING'S AGREEMENT TO BRING CAMBODIA INTO THE INDOCHINESE "PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE" UNDER THE UNSTATED BUT EVIDENT AEGIS OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.

9. CHINESE AND NORTH VIETNAMESE POLICIES ON THE CAMBODIAN SITUATION HAVE NOT CONFLICTED IN ANY MAJOR RESPECT SINCE THEY BOTH EMBRACED THE EXILED SIHANOUK. HANOI WAS DISGRUNTLED OVER PEKING'S RELUCTANCE TO EXCORIATE AMERICAN BOMBING OF CAMBODIA OR TO MAKE AN ISSUE OF ALLEGED THAI INVOLVEMENT, BUT THIS HAD NO EVIDENT EFFECT ON HANOI'S POLICY. THERE HAVE BEEN HINTS FROM BOTH PEKING AND HANOI OF INTEREST IN A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION, BUT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT EITHER HAS PRESSED THE RELUCTANT INSURGENTS ON THE ISSUE. BOTH STATES SEEM REASONABLY SATISFIED WITH EVENTS IN CAMBODIA AND QUITE WILLING TO LEAVE MOST POLICY-SETTING RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE KHMER COMMUNISTS.

10. WHILE THERE IS CLEARLY FRICTION BETWEEN THE NORTH
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VIETNAMESE AND KHMER COMMUNISTS, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT PEKING HAS INTERVENED IN THE CONFLICTS. NONETHELESS, THE CHINESE ARE IMPROVING THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE IN-COUNTRY COMMUNIST LEADERS BY RECEIVING THEM IN PEKING, ACCEPTING

THEIR EFFUSIVE PRAISE OF CHINESE TREATMENT (WHICH SEEMS ADDRESSED IN PART TO HANOI), AND EVIDENTLY DISCUSSING FUTURE AID--ALL OF WHICH MAY WORRY THE HYPERSENSITIVE VIETNAMESE.

11. FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, THE CHINESE WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO ACT ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT NORTH VIETNAM HAS MORE IMPORTANT INTERESTS AT STAKE IN CAMBODIA, THAT THESE DO NOT NECESSARILY CONFLICT WITH CHINA'S, AND THAT, IN ANY EVENT, HANOI'S PREEMINENT POSITION ON THE GROUND LIMITS PEKING'S ABILITY TO SHAPE INSURGENT POLICY. THUS, AS LONG AS HANOI FOLLOWS AN ESSENTIALLY LOW-RISK POLICY AND THERE IS NO BROAD DETERIORATION IN SINO-NORTH VIETNAMESE RELATIONS, THE POLICIES OF THE TWO COMMUNIST STATES TOWARD CAMBODIA ARE LIKELY TO REMAIN QUITE COMPATIBLE.

12. THERE IS NOTHING TO INDICATE THAT PEKING STRONGLY

OPPOSES HANOI'S LONGER-RUN DESIRE FOR A CAMBODIAN REGIME
RESPONSIVE TO ITS INTERESTS OR, AT LEAST, THAT THE CHINESE
ARE SUFFICIENTLY WORRIED OVER THE PROSPECT TO WORK
ACTIVELY TO THWART THE DRV. NONETHELESS, THE CHINESE WILL
TRY TO REESTABLISH AND EXPAND THEIR INFLUENCE IF A MORE
FRIENDLY REGIME COMES TO POWER IN PHNOM PENH, AND SUCH A
REGIME MAY WELL SEEK CHINESE SUPPORT AS A COUNTERWEIGHT
TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LIKELI-
HOOD OF KHMER-VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST FRICTIONS, WILL
HEIGHTEN HANOI'S CONCERN ABOUT CHINESE INTENTIONS EVEN IF
PEKING TRIES TO AVOID DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN ANY CONFLICTS.
THUS, THERE IS LIKELY TO BE A DEGREE OF SINO-DRV RIVALRY
IN CAMBODIA, BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT HOW THIS
WOULD BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO EXPLOITATION BY THE CAMBODIANS OR
BY OTHERS.

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